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RES JUDICATA REDUX*
By TIMOTHY PINOS**

In an incisive analysis of the questions of relitigation, division of claims, and multiplicity of
claims, the article reexamines the various principles subsumed under the doctrine of res
judicata. The revealing analysis of these principles - cause of action estoppel, abuse of
process, and issue estoppel as well as non-mutual estoppel - shows that some are in need of
reformulation while other requirements of these principles should be discarded.
Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.
- George Santayana, The Life of Reason, Vol. II, Reason in Society.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Motorcycle Accident:1 An accident occurred between a
motorcycle driven by A and a car driven by P and owned by Q. B,
a passenger in the motorcycle sidecar (pillion), was injured. In the
first action, Q sued A in negligence for damages to his car and was
successful. Later, B sued P and Q in negligence for damages for
personal injury arising out of the accident. P and Q issued a thirdparty notice against A, claiming to be indemnified on the ground of
A's negligence. Can P and Q rely upon the judgment in the first
case to repel the suit of B? If not, can they rely upon the judgment
to prevent A from disputing liability on the third-party claim?
The Flood Case:2 The plaintiff commenced an action for
damages for flooding to his land which took place in the years 1967
and 1968. It was alleged that a dam erected by the defendant
caused the river it was controlling to overflow and flood. The
action was dismissed. Subsequently, he brought a second action in
respect of damage alleged to have occurred from 1969 to 1972. In
this second action he alleged that the damage was not due to
flooding, but to the creation of an aquifer below the surface of the

1

Shaw v. Sloan (1982), [1982] N.I. 393 (C.A.) [hereinafter Shaw].

2

Toi

of Grandview v. Doering (1975), [1976] 2 S.C.R. 621, 61 D.L.R. (3d) 455

[hereinafter Doering cited to D.L.R.].
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lands, for which the defendant's dam was alleged to be responsible.
Is this second action precluded by the first proceeding?
The Solicitor-Client Controversy:3 C retained S, a solicitor, in
regard to a dispute with C's employer over sick-pay. On the advice
of his solicitor, an action was commenced, but was ultimately
dismissed. C then commenced proceedings against the solicitor
alleging negligent handling of the case and claiming return of money
paid on account of fees and damages. C was successful against S
and was awarded the return of the money paid on account of fees
and damages. S then commenced an action against C for money
owing for professional services rendered in respect of the initial
case. Can C rely upon his successful prior claim against S to defend
this latest suit?
It should be a simple question: to what extent will we allow
litigants to bring the same or similar matters before the courts over
and over again? At its most complex, the question might also
involve whether the system should worry more when it is done
through a direct challenge on a previous decision on the same point,
or when it is done by dividing the claims arising out of a single
incident among a series of lawsuits. The question is certainly basic
to the structure and operation of the litigation system. Yet the
answer, such that it exists, is embedded in a series of obscure
doctrines masquerading under a number of different names and
proclaiming widely divergent approaches. What is even more
disheartening is that these "rules" appear to sanction conflicting
results in cases that appear to be factually similar, all while neatly
avoiding such elementary questions as the objectives of the rules and
standards for their application.
This paper attempts a reassessment of the core of these
rules, which go under such informative titles as res judicata, issue
estoppel, cause of action estoppel, collateral estoppel, estoppel per rein
judicatam, abuse of process, et cetera. The core issues to be
discussed are the rationale for objectives of the law, how the
objectives are to be implemented in the primary legal approaches,
and how wide the net of legal rules should be cast. Existing judicial

3

Cachia v. Isaacs (1985), [1985] 3 N.S.W.L.R. 366 (C.A.).
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performance is assessed, and an alternative approach to the basic
issues is suggested.
A note on terminology is in order. The res judicata in the
title refers to all the techniques and rules which the courts have
used to prevent the re-litigation and division of claims, regardless of
whether they have their traditional origin in estoppel, abuse of
process, or other notions of public policy. The current terminology
of the traditional rules will be introduced later.
As far as the object of these rules is concerned, I distinguish
between cases where a party seeks to have re-litigated a claim or
issue which has been determined in a prior proceeding, and cases
where a party in a subsequent proceeding seeks to litigate an issue
or claim which has not been decided in a prior proceeding, but
could have been joined in a prior case. The former is referred to
as re-litigation and4 the latter, division of claims. Together they are
called mtultiplicity.
II. RATIONALE
It has been repeatedly stated that the overarching aim of the
law of res judicata and related doctrines is to limit the extent to
which parties to a lawsuit may re-litigate claims or issues determined
5
in the lawsuit. Two basic rationales have been advanced:
a) It is in the interests of the State, and therefore a matter of
public policy, that there be an end to litigation; and,
b) hardship is caused to individuals who are made to re-litigate
a point twice as a result of the actions of another party.
No guidance is given as to why it is in the interests of the
state to have an end to litigation, nor is discussion offered as to how
4

1n more general usage, multiplicity connotes not only proceedings resulting from the
failure to join claims in a prior proceeding, but also proceedings arising out of the non-joinder
of parties. This issue has only tangential relevance to the questions addressed in this paper.
5

See, for example, Carl-Zciss-Stiftungv. Rayner and Kecler Ltd (No. 2) (1966), [1967] A.C.
853, [1966] 2 All E.R. 536 at 549, Reid L.J.; New Brunmswick Raihay Co. v. British and French
Trust Corp. (1938), [1938] 4 All E.R. 747, [1939] A.C. 1 at 19-20, Maugham L.J. [hereinafter
New Brunswick Railway, cited to A.C.]; Lockyer v. Fenyman (1877), 2 App. Cas. 519 at 530,
Blackburn L.J.
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re-litigation causes hardship to any party. The vague objection of
preventing the re-litigation of issues must be assessed with reference
to the interests served by its pursuit. The importance of those
interests, and the extent to which they conflict with other value
objectives, will determine the desirable mix of rules adopted by a
court or legislature. The interests protected by a rule restricting relitigation of claims or of issues may be assessed on the basis of those
factors which impinge upon the desirable operation of the
administration of justice.
The court system has an interest in ensuring that proceedings
are tried so that the appropriate level of justice is attained at a
minimum of cost. The multiplicity of claims has the effect of
increasing the amount of wasteful litigation. Both the re-litigation
of claims and the division of claims into multiple lawsuits will impose
extra demands upon scarce court facilities. This is self-evident with
respect to re-litigation. Even if division does not involve re-litigation
in a strict legal sense, there are the additional costs of commencing
and maintaining an additional proceeding, and inevitably, some
substantial duplication of effort with respect to investigation and
proof. A rule restricting the division of claims makes a judgment
that it is more efficient for a number of claims arising out of or
relating to an incident or series of related incidents to be tried
together.
A rule preventing multiplicity therefore generally
mandates a certain economy on the part of litigants that goes to the
benefit of the court system as a whole.
Although the legal literature is full of global condemnation
of re-litigation, 6 it may not be such an obviously bad thing. Might
not the ability to re-litigate result in better decisions? 7 First, there
is nothing to indicate that the second lawsuit will be more likely to
be a correct decision than the first. Assuming that each court
considering the same claim will do so afresh, the likelihood of error
would probably be the same.

6

See supra, note 2 and the collection in G.S. Bower, The Doctrineof Res Judicata,2d ed.
by A.K. Turner (London: Butterworths, 1969) at 10-15.
7

See the discussion in Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 3d ed. (Boston and
Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1986) at 542-44.
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If anything, the likelihood of error would be greater in the
case of the re-litigated claim, although not for reasons associated
with the performance of the court. The quality of decisions in an
adversary system depends in large part upon the efforts taken by the
parties to present their respective cases. 8 Multiplicity may reduce
the incentive of a party to make the utmost effort in the first
lawsuit, because there is always the prospect of oying again by a
party disappointed with the result, either on the same issue (relitigation), or another (division). Preventing multiplicity increases
the incentive on the parties to present their best cases, thus
increasing the quality of judicial decision making.
A variation of these arguments applies specifically to the
division of claims. .First, it is highly unlikely that a divided claim will
not entail the likelihood of substantial re-litigation. Even if one
grants the possibility that there may be some lawsuits involving
divided claims that do not entail substantial re-litigation, a further
objection to divided claims may be mounted. It does not take a
very deep insight to realize that a judge will be better equipped to
effect justice between the parties where the whole controversy
between the parties is before the judge, rather than one isolated
aspect.
These comments, arising out of consideration of the
wastefulness of multiplicity, are also relevant to another basic factor,
the quality of justice. Whatever one might say about its other
functions, one of the primary products of the system of justice is the
resolution of disputes. The resolution of disputes cannot take place
if it is possible that disputes will be re-litigated or divided into
multiple lawsuits. Further, if one is to grant other justice aims as
compensation, deterrence, or rule making, it is equally clear that
these objectives cannot be attained in an environment of
uncertainty. The final resolution of disputes therefore can be
considered to be central to the effective functioning of the system
of justice.
8

See, for example (and the literature is much more voluminous), Sir Richard Eggleston,
"What is Wrong With the Adversary System?" (1975) 49 Aust. LJ. 428; Neil Brooks, "The
Judge and the Adversary System" in Allen M. Linden, ed., The Canadian Judiciary (North
York, Ont.: Osgoode Hall Law School, 1976); and John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, "A
Theory of Procedure" (1978) 66 Cal. L. Rev. 541.
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As part of this goal, courts have an interest in reducing the
risk of inconsistent decisions created by the division or re-litigation
of claims. This may be seen cynically as the desire to eliminate the
potential embarrassment that inconsistency might occasion, but the
consistency and credibility of the adjudication system is important
not only as to the achievement of its goals, but also to its legitimacy
as a social institution.
Rules against re-litigation and division must be viewed
together. A rule which prohibited only re-litigation of claims already
decided, could paradoxically increase the possibility of subsequent
lawsuits on a divided claim. To make operational a rule which
prohibited only re-litigation, the parties to a subsequent proceeding
could not take a position which contradicted the finding in the prior
proceeding. This would enable a party succeeding on the earlier
finding to make further claims on its coattails with little risk of
failure on this issue, and make it easier to divide claims. In order
to prevent such a side-effect from a rule prohibiting re-litigation, it
would be necessary to require that all claims relating to the subjectmatter of the earlier finding be dealt with at one proceeding.
Many of the rationales discussed above also serve to protect
the private interests of the parties. Litigants have a strong general
interest in the certainty and finality of judicial resolution of disputes.
Uncertainty from the threat of re-litigation, or the creation of
inconsistent decisions, undermines the usefulness of dispute
resolution to the parties.
In most cases, the rules against multiplicity act to prevent a
party from imposing additional costs on another. This occurs in a
few cases where the party creating the litigation harasses with
vexatious litigation, to use the conventional terminology. In other
cases, the operation of the indemnity rule as to costs may reduce
the incentive for a party anticipating success to avoid the division of
claims. In these cases, a rule against division of claims would force
a party to economize upon the costs which may be imposed on the
opposite party.
This correspondence between the interests of the justice
system and private litigants may be a happy one, but should not be
viewed as an acceptance that the subjective interests of the parties
should control the application of the rule. Thus, discussion of the
fairness of the operation of any rule against multiplicity should be
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assessed according to its consistent achievement of the objectives set
out above.
A. Conflicting Rationales
Rules governing multiplicity must be viewed in context with
the various elements of the civil procedural system that channel and
structure the flow of litigation.
Finality and prevention of
multiplicity are highly valued, but not at all costs. The right to
obtain review of an otherwise final decision results in channelling
challenges to the decision through the appellate process, 9 rather
than through re-litigation of the point. This coincides with the view
of litigation as a single episode ending in judgment, 10 with the
appeal being litigated as an epilogue to that episode rather than as
a new proceeding.
It has been suggested that the rules to prevent re-litigation
and division of claims conflict with other values important to the
dispute resolution system, namely, permitting "full development of
the contentions and evidentiary possibilities of the various parties,
with the aim of deciding the case upon the merits."11 It is further
suggested that such values would indicate a permissive approach to
re-litigation and division.
There is no necessary conflict between a desire to bring
litigation to an end, and a wish to allow parties a full opportunity to
develop their claims and contentions. If a full opportunity to
present and develop all claims is provided, it is difficult to discern
9

Civil justice in the Commonwealth is characterized by a right to at least one level of

appeal from, or review of, a final trial decision in a civil case: for example, see the Ontario
Courts of Justice Ac 1984, S.O. 1984, c. 11, ss 13, 15, and 17; Victoria Supreme Court Act
1986, s. 10(2); Supreme Court Act (UK), 1981, c. 54, s. 16.
10

Abram Chayes, 'The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation" (1976) 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1281 at 1282-83.
llFleming James, Jr. & Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Civil Procedure, 2d ed. (Toronto and
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977) at 530. The point also has been described as a

contrast in approach between the tennination of disputes and the just resohtion of disputes:
Allan C. Hutchinson, 'The Formal and Informal Schemes of the Civil Justice System: A Legal
Symbiosis Explored" (1981) 19 Osgoode Hall LJ.473 at 476.
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any adverse impact from rules preventing re-litigation and division.
On the contrary, the goal of deciding a case upon the merits would
seem to be well served by the provision of effective rules to ensure
a full airing of the issues within a single lawsuit, and not via multiple
lawsuits. Restrictive, rather than permissive, rules respecting relitigation and division may better assist fuller litigation by providing
an incentive for the parties to take the utmost steps to present their
case (through a prohibition on re-litigation), and through having the
court adjudicate upon the whole of a legal dispute (through a
prohibition on division). The one limitation this may pose for the
application of rules regarding multiplicity is the obvious one that the
party to the prior proceeding must have had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue.
Can any other adverse impact be anticipated from rules
preventing re-litigation or division? There may be some cases where
finality works hardship. These may include cases where there is
difficulty in ascertaining the plaintiff's damages, where there has
been fraud, or in family law cases.1 2 In assessing these particular
cases, however, one should be wary of attributing the cause to relitigation or division rules, where the real cause may be an injustice
or inconsistency in a particular area of law.
Could a rule designed to prevent division result in cases of
undue complexity and length, and thus exceed the court's ability to
deal with the case efficiently? It is conceded that there may be
limits to a court's ability to deal with multi-issue cases. This does
not provide an argument against an effective rule requiring the
joinder of claims in the first instance; rather, it is an argument for
the court to make active use of its wide powers under the rules
to manage the conduct of the proceeding
governing civil proceedings
13
in an efficient manner.

121n certain cases, exceptions may be grafted to deal with factors that interfere with the
assumptions made respecting the conduct of litigants, as in the case of fraud, or where tile
standard model of civil litigation may be less applicable, as in some family law cases. See
generally G.S. Bower & A.K. Turner, supra, note 6 at 303-26.
13

Typically, where the joinder

... may unduly complicate or delay the hearing or cause undue prejudice to a party,
the court may, (a) order separate hearings; (b) require one or more of the claims
to be asserted, if at all, in another proceeding; (c) order that a party be
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B. Alternative Tools
A rule which precludes multiplicity absolutely may be viewed
as a harsh way in which to achieve the desired goals. The first
question is the extent to which the existing rules in this area of the
law have a reasonable chance of attaining these goals, and, if they
are found wanting, whether appropriate variations can achieve them.
This is the subject of the remainder of this article. It is also
necessary to determine whether any other kind of rules may be
more appropriate instruments to achieve the desired objectives.
Although final conclusions on their appropriateness are not possible
before evaluating the operation of the current rules, a preliminary
assessment of the most likely alternatives may be attempted.
1. No rule
It may be argued that rules respecting multiplicity are not
required - that there are sufficient deterrents to prevent multiplicity.
Are there sufficient incentives in the litigation system to make
common law or statutory rules on re-litigation and division of claims
redundant? In particular, the cost of multiple lawsuits, and any
likelihood that the same result would be obtained in the case of relitigation, may deter such multiple proceedings.
This would be a tenable argument if one could be certain
that all the costs occasioned by the re-litigation are borne by the
party causing them. This is not the case. Massive costs may be
imposed (1) upon the administration of justice by a litigant's use of
court time and facilities, (2) upon the opposite party through the
occasioning of additional costs, and (3) upon other litigants vying for
the use of scarce judicial resources. There are also the indirect
impacts of multiplicity upon the administration of justice discussed

compensated by costs for having to attend, or be relieved from attending, any part
of a hearing in which the party has no interest; ... (e) make such other order as is
just.
Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, O.Reg. 560184, r. 5.05. Similar provisions are contained in
U.K. Rules of the Suprenie Court 1965, 0. 15, r. 5 and in Victoria General Rules of Proccedure
in Civil Proceedings, 1986, 0. 9, r. 9.04.
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the direct costs occasioned to public and
above which transcend
14
private litigants.
Further, the costs system will only impose costs on the
private plaintiff if he is unsuccessful. The re-litigating plaintiff with
a strong likelihood of success has the smaller disincentive to litigate.
will only be
Even if he is unsuccessful, the re-litigating plaintiff
15
side.
other
the
of
costs
the
of
portion
liable for a
Where litigants have widely diverging abilities to pay, the
nuisance suit can be an effective means to coerce a less wealthy
party to settle for less than his legal entitlement. Re-litigation may
increase the risk of a nuisance suit based upon this disparity in
wealth, and may be undesirable for that reason alone. Therefore
some incentive needs to be built into the litigation system to reduce
the risk of costly re-litigation.
2. Costs incentives
It has been suggested by some writers that rather than
having a rule which barred re-litigation, costs awards should penalize
parties attempting to re-litigate questions or attempting to raise
issues which16could have been appropriately dealt with in an earlier
proceeding.
Punitive costs awards are only appropriate where the basis
for the award is conduct which adversely affects another party. The
award of costs is therefore some function of the costs incurred by
party in whose favour the award is made. This also acts as a cap on
the punitive award and prevents it from going beyond a full

14See supra, note 7 and text accompanying and following.
15

Under the English system, the customary award of party and party costs to the
successful party represents only a partial indemnity of costs actually incurred: see D.B.
Casson & I.H. Dennis, Odgers' Principles of Pleadingand Practice in Civil Actions in de High
Court of Justice, 21st ed. (London: Stevens & Sons Ltd, 1975) at 371-74.
16

E.W. Cleary, "Res Judicata Reexamined" (1948) 57 Yale L.3. 339 at 347.
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indemnity to the party awarded costs. 1 7 This is not a sufficient
deterrent in the case of re-litigation where its undesirable effects
impact elsewhere in addition to the opposite party. A conventional
award of costs therefore cannot capture all costs occasioned, and
thus cannot act as an adequate incentive to control the threat of relitigation.
Further, a rule prohibiting multiplicity works to actually
prevent such matters from going forward to judgment, thus
preventing the effects of multiplicity in the instant case. A costs
rule operates ex post facto, only providing an incentive effect for
future behaviour by other litigants, and does not act to prevent the
costs imposed on the parties and the judicial system by the current
litigation. Further, given the discretionary nature of most costs
rules, it is uncertain whether judges can be counted upon to make
effective use of punitive costs awards to create any consistent
deterrent.
3. Joinder rules
Might not the use of joinder rules provide an alternative to
a ban on division? Although they could have no effect on relitigation, they could provide sufficient incentive to ensure the
joinder of all related claims in one proceeding.
The proposal is unobjectionable in principle. However, the
suggestion dodges the question of sanction. What should any such
rule provide if a party fails to observe the requirement - a penalty
in costs, or the striking out of the subsequent claim? At this point
the debate shifts to the grounds already canvassed above.
It is important, however, to realize the important connection
between joinder rules embodied in rules of court, and judge-made
rules respecting division of claims. Although the primary joinder of

17Typically, the court is limited in its discretion to awarding solicitor and client costs,
which represents a full indemnity to the party: see Casson & Dennis, supra, note 15 at 373.
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claims rules are generally only permissive, 18 there is the potential for
conflict between a broad rule against division of claims and a narrow
permissive joinder rule. The real possibility of a situation where the
latter requires joinder, and the former prevents joinder, makes clear
the need to harmonize judicial and legislative policies in this regard.
Unfortunately, there is little indication that either judges or
legislators are aware of the issue, let alone its significance.
C. The TraditionalRules
The modern principles of the law in this area may be defined
in three parts. Attempting to use the term res judicata with any
clarity is futile given the wide variety of situations to which it has
been loosely applied. Still, out of the chaos, one may outline the
principles which apply to lawsuits
following three generally accepted
19
involving the same parties:
1. A plaintiff or equivalent claimant may not re-litigate the
same cause of action against the same defendant in two lawsuits.
This is known as the narrow res judicata, or cause of action estoppel.
This principle applies whether or not the plaintiff seeks to re-argue
the factual or legal theory of the litigated cause of action previously
adjudicated upon, or present a new one.
2. Even where the cause of action in the second lawsuit is
different in the sense of not giving rise to a cause of action
estoppel, the plaintiff is precluded from re-litigating issues against
defendants which have been finally determined in the previous
proceeding. This is generally called issue estoppel.
3. In cases where neither of the above estoppels apply, the
court nonetheless retains a general discretion to refuse to allow a
plaintiff to advance a claim where it could have and should have
18

"A plaintiff may join any number of claims against a defendant...":

Victoria General

Rules of Procedure in Civil Proceedings, 1986, 0. 9, r.9.01. Also, Ontario Rules of Civil
Procedurc,supra, note 13, r. 5.01; Rules of the Supreme Court (UK), 1965, 0.14, r. 1.
19
0ne of the clearest recent summaries appears in the judgment of McGarvie J. in Port
of Melbounze Authority v. Anshun Pty. Ltd (1979), [1980] V.R. 321 (S.C.) at 324-25, affd
(1980), [19811 V.R. 81 (F.C.), aff'd (1981), 55 A.LJ.R. 621, 33 A.L.R. 248 (H.C.) [hereinafter
Anshun cited to A.LJ.R.].
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been advanced in a prior proceeding. This discretion is exercised as
part of the inherent jurisdiction of the court to prevent abuses of
the court's process.
Such a simple formulation of the traditional law in this area
hides a number of difficult questions regarding the scope and
application of these "rules." Quotation marks are in order because
the use of the word might be taken to imply some kind of
systematic ordering of criteria. The incremental development of the
law has avoided the discussion of the rationale for stating the rules
in three stages. A first question would be whether there is any
validity to the distinction between cause of action estoppel and issue
estoppel, and, assuming that the first is merely a subset of the latter,
whether much judicial confusion and hairsplitting, as to the
difference between the legal rules, could be avoided. In order to do
so, each of the rules relating to cause of action estoppel and issue
estoppel must be stripped of the heavy encrustations of judicial
elaboration, to bare the essential impact of the rule.
There appear to be two primary distinctions between the
doctrines. The first is that cause of action estoppel encompasses not
only everything that was decided in the earlier cause of action, but
also those things which might have been raised and decided.2 ° Issue
estoppel only applies to those questions actually decided upon in the
earlier proceeding. The former acts to require the joinder of claims
falling under the cause of action umbrella; the latter merely prevents
the part from acting inconsistently with a former decision.
Although some cases have asserted a distinction in principle
between cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel,21 there is little
discernable content in the alleged distinction. Rather, one might
view the existence of the two as a reflection of their historical
development. Cause of action estoppel developed first, and then
issue estoppel arose to deal with instances of re-litigation that were

20

Fidelitas Shzipping Co. Ltd v. VO Exporichleb (1965), [1965] 2 All E.R. 4 at 8-9,

Denning M.R., [1965] 2 W.L.R. 1059.

This is accounted for in part by the scholastic

metaphysic that the cause of action is merged in the judgment:
Turner, supra, note 6 at 355-58.
21

see G.S. Bower & A.X.

For the contention that cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel are based on

completely different principles, see Scntby v. Hoggan (1955), 55 S.R. (NSW) 2.
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not encompassed by the rule as embodied in the narrow version of
res judicata, but were nonetheless seen to be undesirable and to be
prohibited. Finally, the residual resort to abuse of process may be
regarded as an effort on the part of the court to provide for those
cases which did not fall within the traditional doctrines as defined,
but somehow ran afoul of the unarticulated principles underlying
them.
How effective have the courts been in controlling multiplicity
through the two doctrines? The next three sections devote their
attention to this question. Although there are other important
questions that must be determined in an application of the
traditional rules, 22 a useful test of the court's performance lies in the
success they have had in construing the core criteria of cause of
action or issue. The next section discusses the former concept, and
compares it to the use of the abuse of process doctrine.
III.

CAUSE OF ACTION ESTOPPEL AND ABUSE OF
PROCESS

A. What Is a Cause of Action?
There is a remarkable lack of judicial elaboration as to how
one is to go about defining the limits of a cause of action. The
stock definition, that a cause of action is "the fact or combination of
facts which give rise to a right to sue,"23 begs the question. Does
this mean that when deciding whether the two causes of action are
the same, the judge should have regard to identity between the
factual basis of the suits, the legal characterization pleaded, the legal
remedy requested in the suits, or any of the above? Is the scope of
the cause of action to be determined solely by reference to the
factual basis of the two lawsuits? The answer appears to be no.
22

These include: what kinds of judicial decisions can give rise to the estoppel, whether
the former decision was final, whether the former court or tribunal had jurisdiction over the
matter decided. They are beyond the scope of this article.
23
John Burke, Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, 2d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell
Limited, 1977) at 297; see also John S. James, Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words and
Phrases, 4th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell Limited, 1971) at 406.
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The courts are generally quite clear, at least in the abstract, that the
same facts can give rise to different causes of action, and that
separate suits upon each of these causes of action gives rise to no
estoppel. 24
Do we then determine the cause of action with regard to the
legal construction placed on the facts, in the sense that a single
wrongful act may give rise to one cause of action in negligence and
another cause of action in trespass? Here matters become much
murkier. Witness the following:
1. In some jurisdictions, an action in negligence for property
damage does not prevent a subsequent action in negligence for
personal injury, based upon the same accident.25
2. An action for a debt owing under a contract may be a
different cause of action from an action for damages for breach
of contract, notwithstanding that the default
that gave rise to
26
situation.
each
in
same
the
was
each claim
These situations, not atypical, might lead one to conclude
that the distinguishing factor between causes of action lies in the
nature of the demand or remedy sought. However, as the leading
text in the area of numerous cases proclaims, this is not the case:
[I]f ... the facts are identical [and] these facts give rise to substantially one and the
same ground of complaint, the plea of former recovery prevails, notwithstanding
that there may be technical and formal differences between the 2 two
causes of
7
action, or that the two remedies may be called by different names.

Under this banner we find the following results:
A. An action for damages for breach of contract to build a

24

Bnnsden v. Humphrey (1884), [1881-85] All E.R. Rep. 357, 14 Q.B.D. 141 at 146

(C.A.), Esher L.J. [hereinafter Bnmnsden cited to Q.B.D.]; Rowley v. H'ilkinson (1968), [1968]
N.Z.L.R. 334 (C.A.); Hall v. Hall and Hlall's Feed & Grain Ltd (1958), 15 D.L.R. (2d) 638

(Alta. C.A.).
25Bnudsen, ibid. Not followed in Cahoon v. Franks (1967), [1967] S.C.R. 455, 63 D.L.R.
(2d) 274.
26

0verstone Ltd v. Shipway (1961), [1962] 1 W.LR. 117, [1962] 1 All E.R. 53 (C.A.);
Lawlor v. Gray (1984), [1984] 3 All E.R. 345 (Ch. D.).
27

G.S. Bower & A.K. Turner, supra, note 6 at 376, citing Green: v. Weatherill (1929),

[1929] 2 Ch. 213 at 221, [1929] All E.R. Rep. 428.
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house in a workman-like manner precludes a subsequent action
on the same
facts for damages for failure to use proper
28
materials.
B. A claim for damages for breach of an agreement bars 29a
subsequent action for specific performance of the agreement.
One might attempt to distinguish between cases 1 and 2 and
cases A and B on the basis that in the former two, the essential
distinguishing point was the legal construction placed upon the facts,
as opposed to the latter two where the different remedies arose out
of a single legal characterization of the facts.3 0 However, it is
beyond explaining how one can rationally distinguish between the
two pairs in the context of a rule designed to prevent re-litigation
and division of claims. Such inconsistency in treatment would be
perhaps understandable if it were in the course of an extended
judicial debate over the tests to be used in determining the scope of
a cause of action, and more importantly, if it were the appropriate
function of the rule. Unfortunately, there is no sign of a debate, or
even an awareness on the part of the courts that they are arriving
at widely divergent results for no apparent reason.
A particularly good example of the problems of judicial
31
decision making in cause of action estoppel is the Flood Case.
Are the causes of action alleged in the two suits in that case
distinguishable because of the difference in time between when the
various harms occurred? Arguably, however, this relates to the
question of damages, and maybe not to the act (the building of the
dam) which allegedly caused the damage. Does the different
"theory" of causation raised in the second action allow one to

28
Conqucr v. Boot (1928), [1928] 2 K.B. 336, [1928] All E.R. Rep. 120 (Div. Ct.),
followed in Van Amstel v. County Roads Board (1961), [1961] V.R. 780 (S.C.) [hereinafter
Van Amstel], where an action for the recovery of money due under contract was held to
preclude subsequent action for damages for non-payment of the same moneys.
29

tHennig v. Nortern Heights (Satdt) Ltd (1980), 116 D.L.R. (3d) 496, 30 O.R. (2d) 346
(C.A.) [hereinafter Hennig cited to O.R.].
30

Not even Sir Alexander Kingcome Turner attempts such an arpostfacto rationalization

in recounting these cases; see G.S. Bower & A.K. Turner, supra, note 6 at 372-82.
31

Supra, note 2.
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characterize the second action as being based on a different cause
of action? Should it make any difference whether the information
raising the possibility of the aquifer theory of causation was available
at the time of the first action?
The court's analysis in the actual case 32 considered none of
these potential issues, and proceeded on a very simple basis. No
essential difference was found between the two actions. The
holding is conclusion-oriented rather than analytical:
[A]II the facts which are alleged to constitute tortious conduct ... in the present case
to trial and it was there found that these facts
existed when the prior action went
33
did not support the ... action....
The issue of whether the river was caused to overflow its banks by the dam and
damage the respondent's lands ... was thoroughl explored in the first action. Thc
same question is raised in the present action.

Unfortunately, the dissent is expressed in a similar fashion:
It is true that the issue of whether the river was caused to overflow its banks and
damage the respondent's lands ... was thoroughly explored in the first action....
That same question is not raised in the present action. What is urged is a
completely different cause of action said to have occurred at a completely different
35
time of the year....

Both judges spoke with the same focus on the question and the issue

yet both managed to come to completely
in the two proceedings,
36
opposite conclusions.

32

33

Ibid at 549, Ritchie J.

34

1bid. at 462.

35

1bid at 466, Pigeon 3.

36
Quite apart from the conclusive nature of the reasoning typical in these cases, both
judges were guilty of ignoring a body of law that might have provided a firmer, though
conventional, basis for decision. A series of cases dealing with the continuing cause of action
conundrum in the law of damages have held that where one act (here, the construction of the
dam) causes separate damage on two separate occasions, two causes of action accrue: see
Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages, 13th ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell Ltd, 1972)
at 199; S.M. Waddams, The Law ofDamages (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book Limited, 1983)
at 639. If one accepts this without discussion, the plaintiff should not have been barred by
cause of action estoppel.
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Behind these polar positions lie the following issues:
1. Given the lack of any coherent theory of what constitutes a
cause of action for the purposes of the doctrine, does the
concept serve any useful purpose in preventing multiplicity?
Too many of the decisions in this area dissolve into historical
analyses of the content of the forms of action at common law
and their content,37 or adopt the conclusion-oriented approach
illustrated above, forgetting precisely why the question is being
asked.
2. Would it not be better to substitute a test that more closely
reflects the aims of the law? The key value of cause of action
estoppel lies in its barring of claims that ought to have been
litigated in a prior proceeding. The concept of a cause of action
provides no more than a standard by which the court can
determine what ought to have been litigated in a prior action.
Viewed this way, cause of action estoppel becomes more than a rule
of compulsory joinder of claims. One may then confront the
question of how to define which claims should be joined together
squarely. Before that, one should examine the closely related area
of dismissal for abuse of process.
B. Bar"As an Abuse of Process

The courts have long recognized that there are claims which
could and should have been raised in a prior proceeding which it
would be unjust to permit the litigation of, notwithstanding that the
situation does not fall within the boundaries of cause of action
estoppel as conventionally defined. Rather than revise the approach
to "what is a cause of action" to encompass these cases, the judiciary
has relied upon the inherent jurisdiction of the court, holding that
the subsequent claim should be struck out as an abuse of the
process of the court.
This approach does not rely upon a single criterion to
determine whether the subsequent litigation is in fact an abuse.
Rather, the recent judgments in this area have looked backward to

37Sce, for example, Van Amstel, supra, note 28.
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cases which formed the foundation of cause of action estoppel and
extracted their aim, relying principally on the following statements
from 1843 and 1889:
[W]here a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of

adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the Court requires the parties to
that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special
circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in
respect of matters which might have been brought forward as part of the subject
in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from
negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of
res judicata applies, except in special circumstances, not only to points upon which
the Court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce
a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation,
and which the
3 8 parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward
at the time.
... [I]t would be a scandal to the administration of justice if, the same question
having been disposed of by one case, the litigant were to be permitted, by changing
0 .39
the form of the action, to set up that same case again.

The first statement reflects the purposive approach to res judicata
prior to the taking up of the weighty terminological baggage of
cause of action, merger, and bar. It differs from cause of action

estoppel in two important respects. First, the test is directly aimed
at the question of whether the party in the earlier proceeding ought
to have raised the matter which is raised in the second proceeding.
Second, the test acknowledges a substantial degree of discretion as
to what constitutes reasonable diligence or special circumstances,

whereas the cause of action estoppel has been presented as a fairly
40
rigid and objective test.
38

Henderson v. Henderson (1843), 3 Hare 100 at 115, 67 E.R. 313, Wingram V.-C,
[hereinafter Henderson cited to Hare]. This statement has been relied upon by many courts
as a basis for cause of action estoppel: see Doering, supra, note 2 at 548.
39

Reichel v. Magrath (1889), 14 App. Cas. 665 at 668, Halsbury LJ. [hereinafter Reichel].

40

Although the quotation from Henderson, supra, note 38 also forms the basis of
conventional cause of action estoppel, most courts applying the narrower doctrine have
avoided or ignored the question as to whether there was such a special circumstances exception
to the application of the doctrine: see G.S. Bower and A.K. Turner, supra, note 6 at 35556. Some recent Canadian cases referring to Henderson have revived the possibility of there
being such an exception in cause of action estoppel: Hennig, supra, note 29 (if exception
exists, it applies only to matters not expressly dealt with); Re St. Denis and Township of North
Himsworth (1985), 50 O.R. (2d) 482 (Div. Ct.) [hereinafter Re St. Denis]. The High Court
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How have the courts fared in exercising their discretion
under this approach? A review of the most recently decided cases
indicates the following trends:
1. With a few exceptions, the courts have heeded the direction
that negligence, inadvertence, or accident constitute insufficient
41
grounds to escape from the application of the rule.
2. The courts have taken a fairly practical approach to the
question as to whether a litigant had
the opportunity of raising the
42
question in the former proceeding.
3. There is some confusion in the courts as to the degree to
which the test mandates the parties to bring forward all possible
allegations, even in defence. The Privy Council has expressed
the rule as preventing the litigation of matters "which could and
43
therefore should have been litigated in earlier proceedings.
The High Court of Australia has stated that this goes too far where
the failure to raise a defence is in issue. The Court held that in
such cases:
...
there will be no estoppel unless it appears that the matter relied upon as a
defence in the second action was so relevant to the subject-matter
of the first action
44
that it would have been unreasonable not to rely upon it.

In substance, the rule affords a practical replacement for the
hollow rule of cause of action estoppel. In its present form, it
covers the same ground as the traditional rule, and has a potentially
broader scope. It makes explicit the aim of the rule, and does not
use a surrogate.

of Australia has recently affirmed the inapplicability of a "special circumstances" discretion in
cause of action estoppel: Chanberlain v. Depuo , Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988), 78
A.L.R. 271.
411ennig, ibid.;
but see Re St Denis, ibid. (failure of lawyer to raise validity of
administrative action avoided application of rule).
42Yat Tung Izvestment Co. Ltd v. Dao Heng Bank Ltd (1975), [1975] A.C. 581, [1975] 2
W.L.R. 690 (P.C.), Kilbrandon L.
43Ibid at 590.
44Anszun, supra, note 19 at 626.
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This is not to say that the present operation of the rule is
without law. The first difficulty lies with its conceptual basis as an
exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the court to prevent abuses
of process. The concept of abuse is extraordinarily slippery, and
could pave the way for ad hoc decision making, obstructing the
development of truly workable criteria.4 5 It would be more accurate
to define the rule as a return to the underlying principles of res
judicata as expressed in Henderson,4 6 and a discarding of the cause
of action concept that made resort to the abuse of process doctrine
necessary in the first place.
The second potential difficulty lies in the extent to which the
rule will mandate the joinder of claims and defences, and the raising
of all issues in a single proceeding. Should the court look to the
reasonablenessof the party's motivation in failing to raise a question
in an earlier proceeding?4 7 Further, or alternatively, what scope
should the court give to any special circumstances exception?
The reasons advanced at the outset why a rule preventing
division of claims is a necessary part of the law in this area provide
a guide to answer these questions. The subjective motivation of a
party as to why a claim might not have been advanced earlier is
irrelevant to the rationale for the rule. In fact, the rules are there
precisely to provide a contrary incentive for the action which the
party might otherwise have taken.

45

1bid at 626 ("Even the abuse of process test is not one of great utility").

46Supra, note 38.
47

In Antshun, supra, note 19 at 626, the Court stated that "there are a variety of

circumstances ... why a party might justifiably refrain from litigating an issue in one proceeding
yet wish to litigate the issue in other proceedings for example, expense, importance of the

particular issue, motives extraneous to the actual litigation, to mention but a few...," citing
Cromwell v. Sacramento County (1877), 94 U.S. 351 at 356-57. The reliance on Cromwell v.
Sacramento County is problematic in that the proposition was expressed there in relation to
the decision to raise a separate cause of action, the meaning of which has considerably
expanded in the intervening years: see Nevada v. U.S. (1983), 463 U.S. 110 at 130-31. The
American trend is clearly towards the barring of defences and counterclaims that may have
been conveniently raised in the earlier proceeding: see American Law Institute [hereinafter

ALl], Restatement (Second) of Judgments (St. Paul, Minnesota: American Law Institute
Publishers, 1982) at s. 22.
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C. A Unified Test
Assuming that the cause of action estoppel and the abuse of
process approaches can be merged into a single rule, what is the
content of that rule to be? The extreme rule would be to require
both parties to assert all claims and defences between them when a
lawsuit is commenced whether or not the various claims have
anything to do with one another factually, leaving it to the discretion
of the court to organize the most effective way for the pre-trial and
trial handling of those issues. It is probably not necessary to go that
far, and it should be possible to formulate a rule which reflects the
law's main concern - that all questions and issues related to a
factual dispute or incident involving two parties be litigated once
and for all at one time.
The first temptation is to try to supplant the concept of a
cause of action with another concept that directs the court's
attention more broadly. In other contexts, and other jurisdictions,
the concepts matter,48 or transaction,49 have been construed fairly
broadly, and may provide possible candidates for a test. An
alternate approach would be to say that when litigation arises
between two parties, both are under an obligation to raise all claims,
counterclaims, and defences arising out of or connected to the
original subject-matter of the lawsuit, and whether raised or not,
they may not be raised in a subsequent proceeding.
Regardless of the choice, it is suggested that the following
criteria are relevant to the scope of the judge's power under either
formulation of the rule
1. Would a reasonably diligent party, acting with reasonably
diligent legal advice, have been aware of the opportunity to
advance the claim or defence?

48

In Australia, the concept has been used to create a pragmatic and expansive approach

to the pendent and ancillary jurisdiction of the federal courts: see Fencott v. Muller (1983),
46 A.L.R. 41, 57 A...J.R. 317 (H.C.).
49

ALI, Restatement (Second) of Judgments, supra, note 47 at s. 24.
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2. Was the claim or defence connected in any way with the
subject-matter of the earlier litigation?" °
3. Was the claim or defence available at the time of the earlier
proceeding, in the sense of having accrued?
4. Did the court in the prior proceeding have jurisdiction over
the claim or defence asserted in the subsequent proceeding?
If the answer to these questions is yes, then prima facie, the
attempt to litigate the claim or defence in a subsequent proceeding
should fail. As regards the special circumstances legacy of the
Henderson5 1 exception, the sole basis of the inquiry should be
whether there was fraud, duress, or similar improper conduct on the
part of any person which prevented the joinder.
Such a rule, when combined with the other traditional
requirements in this area,5 2 would allow for the development of a
general doctrine against a party splitting its case which would
subsume the old cause of action estoppel and abuse of process
approaches into a single, unified approach.
IV. ISSUE ESTOPPEL
The preceding section focused on the rules aimed primarily
at division of claims, and only incidentally at the re-litigation of
disputes. The concurrent doctrine of issue estoppel is aimed solely
at the re-litigation of disputes already decided.
If there existed a comprehensive and effective rule relating
to cause of action estoppel - abuse of process, as discussed in the
previous section - would there be any need for a separate doctrine
of estoppel? Under the former rule, all issues connected with or
arising out of a matter or transaction would be required to be raised
in the first proceeding. Thus, a plaintiff or defendant in the second
proceeding would be prevented from raising the question, much less
50As the economy of joinder relates primarily to the avoidance of duplication of proof,
and factual and legal decision making, this criteria avoids the necessity to join factually
unrelated claims.
51

Supra, note 38.

52

See supra, note 22.
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taking a position contrary to it. While this may be the case, and
most cases now dealt with under issue estoppel could be disposed of
under a revised cause of action estoppel, there would be situations
where there would be a need for the doctrine to be retained. The
first is in situations where jurisdiction over the matter or transaction
is unavoidably divided between two or more courts or tribunals.
Here, it would be impossible for all questions arising out of the
transaction or matter to be adjudicated in one proceeding. A rule
as to issue estoppel, however, would be necessary to prevent relitigation of issues decided in the prior proceeding. The second
situation arises if the traditional requirement of mutuality is
eliminated. 53
Under its traditional approach, the court determining the
application of issue estoppel asks itself three basic questions. First,
is the judgment relied upon a final judgment? Second, are the
parties to the two pieces of litigation the same? Third, are the
issues giving rise to the estoppel the same? Although there is a vast
amount of case-law dealing with matters arising out of the first two
questions, it is the third that raises the most fundamental questions
regarding the scope of the doctrine. As a means of assessing
effectiveness of the rules, two questions are considered. The first is
the extent to which a default judgment can give rise to an issue
estoppel. The second is how the courts have gone about generally
in determining whether there is an identity between the two issues
in the former and subsequent proceedings.
A. Default Judgments
While there is little question that a default judgment can
give rise to cause of action estoppel, 54 the extent to which a default
5
judgment can form issue estoppel is open. 5
53

Sce infra, notes 62-88 and accompanying text.

54

IHalsbury'sLaws of England, 4th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1976), vol. 16, para. 1520.

55

New Bnrnswick Railway, supra, note 5 at 21, Maugham Li. (an estoppel based upon
a default judgment "must be very carefully limited."); Kok Iloong v. Leong Cheong Kweng
Mines Ltd (1963), [19641 A.C. 993 at 1012, [19641 1 All E.R. 300 (P.C.).
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One line of judicial reasoning holds that a default judgment
can give rise to an issue estoppel, but that the court must examine
the previous action to determine what was "necessarily, and with
Such a test is, of course,
complete precision," decided.56
nonsensical. The conundrum for issue estoppel founded on a
default judgment is that there is no reasoned judgment from which
one can extract any decided issues. A pleading may contain a series
of broad allegations, many of which may be inconsistent with one
another.57 How can one, except by metaphysical abstraction or by
lot, determine which of the issues raised in the pleading have been
necessarily decided when no decision has been reached? Or is one
to adhere to the procedural fiction deeming a defaulting party to
have admitted all the allegations against him, 58 and happily conclude
that all of the allegations in the pleading, inconsistent or not, can
give rise to an estoppel in a subsequent proceeding. This leads to
a ridiculous result: the creation of several estoppels because of
divergent or inconsistent versions of facts.
An alternative approach which may be emerging is that a
default judgment cannot give rise to an issue estoppel, because there
has been no judgment on the merits. 59 Here the estoppel would
apply where the court had actually made a determination on the
merits of the case, and it could be said that explicitly or implicitly it
had decided the necessary issues before it. It would avoid the

56

New Brunswick Railway, ibid.

57

And perfectly permissible, so long as they are pleaded in the alternative: Ontario Rules
of Civil Procedure,supra, note 13 at r. 25.06(4); Victoria General Rules of Procedure in Civil
Proceedigs,1986, 0. 13, r. 13.09(1); Philipps v. Philipps (1878), 4 Q.B.D. 127.
58

Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure,supra, note 13 at r. 19.02(1); Victoria General Rules
of Procedure in Civil Proceedings,1986, 0. 13, r. 13.12(1); Rules of the Supreme Court (UK),
1965, 0. 18, r. 13(1); Cribb v. Fre.berger (1918), [1919] W.N. 22 (C.A.).
59Lord Brandon of Oakbrook in D.S.V Silo-und Verwaltungs-Gesellschaft mLb.H v.
Owners of the Sennar (1985), [1985] 1 W.L.R. 490 at 499, [1985] 2 All E.R. 104 speaks of the
requirement that the judgment be on the merits:
[A] decision on the merits is a decision which establishes certain facts as proved or
not in dispute; states what are the relevant principles of law applicable to such facts;
and expresses a conclusion with regard to the effect of applying those principles to
the factual situation concerned.
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problems with the existing approach, and allow the courts to base
their decision on an analysis of a real judgment with reasons.
Such an approach reflects the rationale for the rule more
closely. If the main aim is to prevent the re-litigation of questions
previously determined by the court, it would follow that the rule
should only apply where there is re-litigation of a question which
has been actually determined by the court in a prior proceeding.
Such an approach addresses the main reservations expressed in the
case-law respecting the creation of estoppels by default judgments,
while eliminating the need for the court to engage in an after-thefact inquiry into the reason why a party chose not to defend a
particular claim.
If it makes sense that, generally, default judgments should
not give rise to an issue estoppel, why then allow a cause of action
estoppel to be created by the same judgment? The reason for
allowing a cause of action estoppel to be set up by a default
judgment is to provide an incentive for the parties to raise all of the
claims relevant to a matter or transactionin the one proceeding and
avoid division. If a default judgment did not give rise to a cause of
action estoppel, a party could avoid the rule by simply defaulting,
without endangering his ability to litigate the same matter in a
Further, the practical problems of issue
subsequent lawsuit.
delineation in default judgments are not raised to the same degree
in the assessment of the scope of a matter or transaction.
B. Scope of the Issue
Have the problems of interpretation that have afflicted the
courts when dealing with the concept of cause of action recurred
when the same courts have turned their attention to issue? In lieu
of a cause of action's conclusion-oriented characterization, the courts
have enunciated a number of rules to assist with the60definition of
what is an issue. The main variations articulated are:

60

Blair v. Curran (1939), 62 C.L.R. 464 at 532, Dixon J; Hoystead v. Commissioner of
Taxation (1925) 1 W.W.R. 286, [1926] AC. 155 at 166 (P.C.), Shaw LJ.
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1. The question must have been directly (as opposed to
indirectly or collaterally) in use in the former proceeding; that is,
essential to the court's disposition of the case.
2. The former decision concludes not only the direct point
expressly litigated and decided, but all matters necessary to that
decision.
3. The former decision concludes all facts fundamental to the
decision.
Two points arise out of these rules: first, that not all
questions actually decided give rise to an estoppel; and second, an
estoppel can be created on matters not explicitly decided by the
court in the prior proceeding.
The requirement of directness or of being essential to the
decision in the case parallels the traditional obiter-ratio distinction in
the doctrine of precedent.
Is the analogy an appropriate
justification for limiting the effect of a former decision? If the
question is actually litigated between parties, and decided by the
court, a subsequent narrow construction of what is essential to the
prior decision would result in a counter-productive restriction on the
effort to prevent re-litigation. The real rationale for the limitation
must be that a judge may make findings on non-essential matters
that were not seriously litigated by parties, and concern for the
quality of adversarial decision making militates against such a
decision being final. This justifiable concern is better met by a rule
extending the estoppel to issues decided which were seriously litigated
by the parties, whether or not they were essential to the result in
the case.
The second characteristic referred to, the ability to estop
matters not specifically litigated in the prior proceeding, flows from
the need to take a substantive rather than a formalistic approach to
the scope of the prior decision. Any given decision may have a
number of findings of fact or law implicitly wrapped up in it. To
allow a subsequent case to proceed on the basis of a challenge to
one of the implicit findings, but not the ultimate finding in the prior
proceedings, would provide an ulimited number of avenues for the
litigant escaping the application of the rule.
It should be quickly apparent that while these rules provide
benchmarks which revolve around the identification of what aspects
of the prior decision may be looked at to establish an estoppel, they
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do not strictly speak to the comparison between the former and
present proceedings. How have the courts fared in making this
comparison?
The Solicitor-Client Controversy61 provided the New South
Wales Court with an exercise in determining whether the issue
decided in the first case covers the issue in the second case. The
majority of the court analyzed the first decision to find what was
explicitly decided and what findings were implicit. They found that
the first decision created an estoppel in the second case on the
question of whether the client received any benefit from the services
rendered.
While the analysis of the court of what was necessarily
decided by the first claim is unobjectionable as far as the result
achieved is concerned, the test depends upon a technical parsing of
the finding in the prior case which a court may perform liberally, or
illiberally, as the case or the temperament of the court may vary.
An alternative way to approach the question would be to ask
whether a finding on the issue raised in the second case would be
in any way inconsistent with or undermine the finding in the former
case. If so, the parties to the second case are estopped from
litigating the point. Such a test may provide the courts with a more
pragmatic approach to the question of re-litigation.
V. EXPANDING NON-MUTUAL ESTOPPEL
One of the central premises of the existing law respecting
res judicata is that the rules only apply where the same parties are
involved in the two proceedings. This is the requirement of
mutuality. This requirement may be met by showing that a party in
the latter proceeding was in privity with a party in the former
proceeding, so that the two are regarded as having the same interest
in the two proceedings.
The requirement of mutuality does not flow automatically
from the premises of the law in this area. If economy of resources,
and reduction of uncertainty in judicial decision making are two
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Supra, note 3 and accompanying text.
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primary motivations, there is little reason to suspect that the
estoppel could not apply usefully where the subsequent proceeding
involves only one party. Consider the Motorcycle Accident.62 The
central question in the former proceeding was whether the
motorcycle driver's negligence caused the accident. In the second
case, similarly, the success or failure of the action of the sidecar
passenger would depend upon whether the accident was due to the
fault of the car driver, the motorcycle driver, or both. In the thirdparty proceedings, the sole question before the court would be the
negligence of the motorcycle driver in causing the accident, the same
issue as in the first case. However, under application of the
mutuality requirements and the limited scope of the privity rule, the
finding against the motorcycle driver in the first action could not be
used against the sidecar passenger to prevent the issue of the
responsibility of the motorcycle driver for the accident from being
re-litigated. 63 Further, while the finding in the first lawsuit could be
relied upon by the owner of the car in the third-party proceeding,
it could not be relied upon by the driver of the car, as he was not
a party to the prior determination.
So long as the issue tried in the subsequent action is the
same, there appears to be no cogent reason for not holding the
party common to both actions bound by the prior determination. Of
course, since a basic assumption in the traditional rule is that the
parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate the issue being
raised again in the second action, it is assumed, at this stage, that
the estoppel could not apply to any party in the second proceeding
who was not a party in the first proceeding.64 But the fact that the

62Supra, note 1.
63

1t is conceded that if the question of contributory negligence on the part of the driver
had not been raised in the first proceedings, it would be open to suit in the second
proceeding.
640n this point, see infra, note 100 and accompanying text.
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effect of the rule65is asymmetrical does not afford an automatic basis

for its rejection.
The requirement of mutuality has been met with a number
of differing responses. There are a small number of decisions where
a party has been held to have been estopped in a subsequent
proceeding, even though the opposite party was not involved in the
prior case. This has been achieved in the confines of the traditional
approach either through ignoring the requirement of mutuality, 66 or
by stretching unbelievably the concept of who are privy to the
parties in the first proceeding. 67 The courts, however, have adhered

to a relatively strict notion of mutuality.68
This blockade against the use of prior judgments in cases
involving only one of the former parties has been traditionally
assisted by the rule in Hollington v. F. Hewthorn & Co., Ltd,69 that
evidence of a conviction in a criminal case was inadmissible in a
subsequent civil proceeding as evidence of guilt. Overruled by
statute in England, 70 and now considered to have been wrongly

65

The origin of the mutuality requirement has been blamed on the misapplication of a
paragraph in Sir Edward Coke, Commentaries on Littleton, 19th ed. (Philadelphia: Robert H.
Small), vol. 17, s. 667, at 352a: see McIlkenny v. Chief Constable of the West Midlands (1980),
[1980] 2 All E.R. 227, [1980] 1 Q.B. 283 at 327-30 (C.A.), Goff LJ.
66

See, for example, Remnant v. Savoy Estate, Ltd (1949), [1949] 2 All E.R. 286 (C.A.).

67

Cavers v. Laycock, Cardinaland CardinalShell Service Station (1963), 40 D.L.R. (2d)
687, [1963] 2 O.R. 639 (Ont. H.C.) (passenger and driver in car accident are privy); Raison
v. Fentwick (1981), 120 D.L.R. (3d) 622 (B.C.C.A.) (school board employees' written reports,
privy to the school board, terminates a teacher's appointment on the basis of the reports).
68
Mills v. Cooper (1967), [1967] 2 All E.R. 100, [1967] 2 Q.B. 459 at 468-69. Most cases
have refused to hold that any of a passenger, owner, or driver of a car in an accident can be
in privity: Shaw, supra, note 1 and cases cited therein. See also Gleeson v. I. Wippell & Co.
Ltd (1977), [1977] 1 W.L.R. 510, [1977] 3 All E.R. 54 (Ch.D.) (re-litigation of same issue of
copyright infringement for same product against different defendants not estopped).
69

Hollington v. F. Hewihom & Co., Ltd (1943), [1943] 1 K.B. 587, [1943] 2 All E.R. 35
(C.A.) [hereinafter Hollington cited to K.B.].
70

U.K. Civil Evidence Act 1968, c. 64, s. 11.
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decided,71 the rule has been eliminated or is on the verge of
elimination by judicial decision in New Zealand, 72 Canada, 734 and
most recently, Australia. 74
Another set of developments forming a background to the
question of mutuality has been the statutory response to the
traditional rule. In a number of discrete areas of the law,
legislatures have enacted piggyback provisions which allow a finding
in a prior proceeding to be used as plima facie evidence in a
subsequent proceeding against the party defending in the first
proceeding. These provisions are most generally used where powers
of public and private enforcement overlap, and usually envisage the
private action riding
on the coattails of the findings in the prior
75
public prosecution.
These developments, occurring in and around the contours
of the traditional rules, have posed a number of difficult questions
which courts have begun to grapple with. The primary question is
the extent to which a prior judgment will be binding upon a party
to that finding in a subsequent proceeding. Predictably enough,
there have been a number of differing approaches, although all
exhibit varying degrees of willingness to evade the traditional
requirement of mutuality. In all cases, these approaches have been
fashioned outside of the limits of traditional doctrines.

71Hunter v. Chief Constable of the West Midlands (1981), [1981] 3 W.L.R. 906, [1981] 3
All E.R. 727 at 734, Diplock L.J.

72Jorgensenv. News Media (Auckland)Ltd (1969), [1969] N.Z.L.R. 961 (C.A.) [hereinafter
Jorgensen].
73

Demeter v. British Pacific Life Ins. Co. (1983), 43 O.R. (2d) 33 (H.C.), aff'd (1984), 13

D.L.R. (4th) 318, 48 O.R. (2d) 266 (CA.) [hereinafter Demeter cited to O.R.].
74Mickelberg v. Director of the Perth Mint W.A.S.C. [unreported], 7 June 1985, (P.C.),
see also Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Gungor (1982), 42 A.L.R. 209, 63

F.L.R. 441 at 447-48 (F.C. Aust.), Fox J.
75

Typical examples occur in the antitrust field. See, for example, Australia, Trade
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A. The Abuse of ProcessApproach
Unwilling to redefine existing doctrines located in estoppel,
some courts have found a basis to prevent non-mutual re-litigation
in the inherent jurisdiction of the court to prevent abuses of the
court's process. The most recent authoritative statement comes
from the House of Lords:
The abuse of process ... is the initiation of proceedings in a court of justice for the

purpose of mounting a collateral attack on a final decision against the intending
plaintiff which has been made by another court of competent jurisdiction in

previous proceedings in which the intending plaintiff had7 6 a full opportunity of
contesting the decision in the court by which it was made.

It is uncertain whether this statement of approach should be used as
anything more than identifying one category of circumstances where
an abuse has been found. 77 Prior abuse of process cases, in
situations of re-litigation, have, at their most informative, used
vaguer standards relating to the existence of vexatious or oppressive
conduct.78
Even if one is to accept the above statement as a general
definition of abuse of process as applied to non-mutual re-litigation,
there are substantial difficulties with the standard suggested. The
focus on a collateral attack implies that what the court is primarily
concerned with is conduct which has an improper motive or object.
Otherwise, the characterization of the subsequent action by the
plaintiff as an attack becomes meaningless. Apart from the practical
problems of determining what the motives of a litigant are, the test
may exclude a whole range of re-litigation which should be avoided,
and begs for narrow application by the courts. Further, the test
speaks only to actions by a plaintiff, and does not address the extent
to which defendants may be bound by the doctrine, which has been

76

Supra, note 69 at 733, Diplock LJ.

77

In the ellipsis omitted from the passage quoted, Lord Diplock refers to the abuse of

process, "which the instant case exemplifies," ibid.
78

For example, see Reichel, supra, note 39; Westmoreland Green and Blue Slate Co. v.

Feilden (1891), [1891] 3 Ch. 15 (C.A.).
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taken by some courts to refuse to supply the statement to relitigation on the part of a defendant. 79
Given these difficulties, it is of little surprise that efforts in
subsequent cases to apply this statement have fallen back on the
more general test of is this an abuse?80 This approach is totally
inadequate. It involves the exercise of an unprincipled discretion,
without substantive guidance, except for a few analogous cases and
the judge's own ad hoc sense of what is appropriate. 81 The absence
of any attempt to articulate a rationale or standard deprives litigants
of any guidance as to their conduct in the litigation process, and
constitutes an abrogation of judicial responsibility. Participants in
the litigation system have a simple right to know the basis upon
which their case is in any danger of being dismissed for abuse of
process.
The use of a standard based upon abuse of process is also
subject to the historical reluctance of the courts to resort to the
inherent jurisdiction of the courts, except in the most extreme
circumstances;8 2 a reluctance based in part upon the problems of ad
hoc decision making already mentioned. Part of this also relates to
79

For judgments which have already asserted its inapplicability to defendants, see Bragg

v. Oceanus Mutual UnderwritingAssociation (Bennuda) Ltd (1982), [1982] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 132
at 137, Kerr Li. [hereinafter Bragg]; Q. v. Minto ManagementLtd (1984), 15 D.L.R. (4th) 581,
46 O.R. (2d) 756 at 757-61 (H.C.), Steele 3. [hereinafter Minto Management cited to O.R.];
Re Del Core and Ontario College of Pharmacists(1985), 19 D.L.R. (4th) 68, 51 O.R. (2d) 1

at 18 (C.A.), Houlden J.A. [hereinafter Re Del Core cited to O.R.]; but contrast Nigro v.
Agnew-Surpass Shoe Stores Ltd (1977), 82 D.L.R. (3d) 302, 18 O.R. (2d) 215 (H.C.), aff'd

(1977), 84 D.L.R. (3d) 256, 18 O.R. (2d) 714 (C.A.) [hereinafterAgnew-Surpasscited to O.R.]
(prior judgment against defendants precludes their relying upon same defence in subsequent
proceeding).
80Bragg and Re Del Core, ibid.
81

The vagaries of the approach are well illustrated by the decision at first instance in
Agnew-Surpass, supra, note 79, which could be construed as an application of extended issue
estoppel, ad hoc abuse of process, or extended privity. See the discussion in Michael J.
Herman & Gerald F. Hayden, Jr., "Issue Estoppel: Mutuality of Parties Reconsidered" (1986)
64 Can. Bar Rev. 437 at 454-59.
82

Lawrance v. Norreys (1890), [1886-90] All E.R. Rep. 858, 15 App. Cas. 210 at 219,

Herschell L-3. [hereinafter Lawrance cited to App. as.] (jurisdiction "ought to be very
sparingly exercised, and only in very exceptional cases"); see generally, 1. H. Jacob, "The
Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court" (1970) 23 Curr. Leg. Prob. 23.
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the generally accepted implication that conduct which constitutes an
abuse somehow involves impropriety. Such a standard is simply not
relevant or appropriate to the regulation of the volume and content
of litigation.
B. The Prima FacieApproach
Another line of thought has emerged out of the decline of
Hollington.8 3 Under this approach, the question is treated as an
evidentiary one: assuming that the prior judgment or finding is
admissible, what weight should it be given? With few exceptions,
cases approaching the question from this angle have held that the
former judgment or finding is to be treated as pfima facie evidence
of the facts on which it was based.84 It is prima facie evidence only,
and is subject to rebuttal by the party against whom it is proved.,
Such a rule represents a half-way house between treating the
former finding as conclusive and not open to dispute, and giving it
no weight at all. Is this an appropriate resting point for a test? It
is not, for two distinct reasons.
First, the rule does not prevent the re-litigation of previously
tried findings. It merely shifts the adjudicative basis upon which that
re-litigation takes place. By making the prior finding prima facie
evidence, the rule increases the risk to the party wishing to engage
in the re-litigation, but does not attempt to prevent the matter from
being raised and litigated once again. At best, the rule raises the
costs to the party wishing to re-litigate, and may act only as a partial
85
disincentive to re-litigation.
Second, the rule has the potential for creating ludicrous
problems for the judge at the second trial. If the party against
whom the finding is adduced decides to call evidence in rebuttal,

83Supra, note 69.
84

Jorgensen, supra, note 72; Demeter, supra, note 73; Rosenbaum v. Law Society of

Manitoba (1983), [1983] 5 W.W.R. 752, 22 M.R. (2d) 260 (Man. Q.B.); Re Del Core, supra,

note 79.
85

See parallel discussion, supra, note 16 and accompanying text.
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how is the judge to weigh the probative value of a prior judgment
against testimonial evidence? Is he to go behind the judgment and
reasons to see whether the evidence presented in rebuttal was
adduced at the first trial, and to see what weight the judge in the
prior proceeding attached to that evidence? If any believable
evidence is adduced in rebuttal, will it be inevitable that the party
originally entering the prior judgment6 in evidence will, in reply, have
8
to prove again the original finding?
On either ground, the use of a prima facie standard should
be rejected. It is therefore unfortunate that, with few exceptions,
the trend in courts and legislatures post-Hollington87 is to treat
former judgments as being only prima facie evidence of the facts
upon which they are based.
Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that a number of
cases have treated the two approaches described above as being
sequential tests which could be combined into one, such that, the
prior judgment is admissible as prima facie evidence, which the
opposite party is free to rebut, unless to do so would constitute an
abuse of process of the court. 88 Such an approach merely combines
the shortcomings of the two approaches, creating a needlessly
bifurcated test for the determination of what is really a single
question.

86

Some judges have recognized the potential difficulties, but have little clue as to their
resolution:
I do not overlook the practical difficulties which in some cases may arise in
determining what weight should be given to proof of a conviction of a crime which
is again in issue in civil proceedings but I think these difficulties are more apparent
than real for the weight to be given to the conviction will vary very considerably

according to the nature of the civil action with which the Court is concerned and
the circumstances surrounding the conviction.
Jorgensen, supra, note 72 at 980, North P. For examples of the difficulties which can arise

under statutory prima facie approaches, see Taylor v. Taylor (1970), [1970] 2 All E.R. 609,
[1970] 1 W.L.R. 1148 (C.A.); Wauchope v. Mordecai (1969), [1970] 1 All E.R. 417, [1970] 1
W.L.R. 317 (C.A.). See also Herman & Hayden, supra, note 81 at 459-64.
87

Supra, note 69.

88

See Demeter, supra, note 73; Re Del Core, supra, note 79; Taylor v. Baribeau (1985), 21
D.L.R. (4th) 140, 51 O.R. (2d) 541 (Div. Ct.).
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C. The CollateralEstoppel Approach
A further approach is to treat the finding in the former
adjudication as conclusive and binding upon the common party in
the subsequent proceeding. Essentially, it redefines issue estoppel
so that it applies to non-mutual situations. Superficially, this
approach reflects the aims articulated earlier most closely. Assuming
that the party bound has participated in the previous proceeding,
and the issue was finally determined, there seems little reason why
it should be open to that party to avoid the consequences of that
finding when the same question is raised in a subsequent proceeding.
To this point, I have assumed that there is little difference
from a policy standpoint between situations of mutuality and nonmutuality as far as issue estoppel is concerned. Does the application
of non-mutual issue estoppel pose any problems, either as to the
avoidance of multiplicity, or other values in litigation?
In the United States, where a general doctrine of non-mutual
issue estoppel or collateral estoppel has been embraced,8 9 there has
been preliminary consideration of the circumstances which might
militate against a routine application of such a rule in all cases.
The first step has been to distinguish between cases where the
estoppel is asserted by a defendant against a plaintiff (defensive
estoppel), and where the plaintiff asserts the estoppel against a
defendant (offensive estoppel). Although, in both cases, the party
against whom the estoppel is asserted has lost the issue in the prior
litigation, several reasons have been advanced as to why the reasons
for an application of offensive estoppel may be less absolute than
those favouring an application of defensive estoppel. 90
The first reason relates to the incentive effect of offensive
collateral estoppel. A plaintiff relying upon an estoppel against a
defendant may wait for the plaintiff in the first lawsuit to litigate
and win an issue against the defendant in the first lawsuit.
Adopting a wait and see attitude allows the second plaintiff to
fieeload on the effort of a successful first plaintiff, and creates a
positive disincentive to the second plaintiff joining in the first action.
89

Blonder-Tongue Laboratoriesv. University of Illinois Foundation 402 U.S. 313 (1971),
91 S. Ct. 1434 (1971); Parkiane Hosiery Co. v. Shore (1979), 439 U.S. 322, (1979) 99 S. Ct.
645 [hereinafter PardaneHosiery cited to U.S.].
90

See Park-aneHosiery, ibid at 329-31.
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91
The alleged result: more, rather than less, litigation.
There are a number of problems with this superficially
attractive proposition. First, freeloading is usually a good thing in
litigation. The benefit of freeloading is that it saves the parties to
the proceeding and the court the cost of retrying the question
determined in the prior proceeding.
Second, increasing the total amount of litigation is not
automatically a bad thing. What is undesirable is the re-litigation of
claims - in other words, wasteful litigation. Offensive collateral
estoppel seeks to eliminate the first sort of waste, and the kind of
division of claims discussed here does not arise in such a case. As
far as the non-joinder of parties is concerned, the question is more
complex than discussed in the cases. The asserted incentive to nonjoinder of parties may be inaccurate when applied to litigation
systems based upon the English model. Given the relatively low
level of incentives for the joinder of plaintiffs in the English
system,92 it is unlikely that offensive estoppel will create significant
additional incentives for potential litigants, who would have
otherwise joined in the prior case, not to join as co-plaintiffs. On
the other hand, it could create benefits for those piggybacking
litigants who would not have had the opportunity nor ability to join
in the initial case, and who lack the resources to litigate the whole
matter afresh.
The second rationale for limiting the availability of offensive
estoppel is that it might be unfair.93 Unfairness is not defined but
is described by example:
1. The claim in the first suit may be small and the defendant
may have little incentive to defend, particularly if future suits are
unforeseeable;
2. the finding, forming the basis for estoppel, may itself be
contradicted by other prior cases; and

91

Ibid at 330.

92

These include minimal requirements of compulsory joinder, restrictive joinder of parties
rules, and the lack of an effective class action provision: see Ontario Law Reform
Commission, Report on Class Actions (1982), vol. 1, 9-49, 76-77.
93

ParklaneHosiery, supra, note 89 at 330-33.
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3. the second action might afford the defendant procedural
opportunities not available in the first action (for example, cost
or convenience of the forum).
The illustrations given seem appropriate and consonant with the
general aims of the law, subject to one proviso.
Is the
determination of the incentive to litigate and the existence of
procedural opportunities to be determined by a subjective analysis of
the position of the party in the earlier lawsuit, or by an objective
determination based on the expectations of a reasonable litigant?
The former is undesirable, as it could lead to decision making based
upon an after-the-fact assessment of the subjective preferences of
the party.
The other problem relates to the use of the general
characterization of unfairness. Although it is clear that the court
wants to give itself an "escape hatch" to deal with unforeseen
situations, the nature of the discretion could have been tied more
94
tightly to the examples given.
In the end, I am unconvinced that it was necessary for an
acceptance of offensive estoppel that required trial courts to be
granted a broad discretion to determine when it should be applied. 95
Particularly in the English model of litigation, failure to join in the
earlier proceeding should not be a reason to disallow the use of
collateral estoppel. What discretion that court should have to
exclude collateral estoppel, should be related specifically to a
substantial disparity of procedural opportunity and incentive for the
person against whom the estoppel is asserted.
It would therefore appear that a rule based upon issue
estoppel, but dispensing with the requirement of mutuality provides
the most appropriate approach to the effect of prior judgments in
non-mutual situations. Before confirming this conclusion, it is
necessary to consider two possible factors which might militate
against an application of non-mutual issue estoppel in all cases.

94

For emxample, points one and three could have been viewed as aspects of the party
having had a full and fair opportunity and incentive to litigate the issue in the prior

proceeding.
95

For a contrary view, see Herman & Hayden, supra, note 81 at 467-68.
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1. Are criminal cases different?
As long as mutuality applied, any interaction between
criminal and civil cases was avoided. Are there any concerns arising
out of any differences between the nature of the criminal and civil
trial processes that might temper the application of non-mutual issue
estoppel?
The difference in standard of proof should make little
difference where it is a criminal judgment being used in a
subsequent civil case; 96 in fact, the higher standard of proof should
make the finding more, rather than less, dependable. Problems of
issue identification, particularly in the case of jury trials, will occur,
but they are no different in kind than problems which crop up in
the application of issue estoppel between civil cases.
Is it somehow unfair to add to the consequences which can
flow from a criminal conviction, by facilitating its subsequent effect
in civil proceedings. In cases where the criminal ramifications of an
act are minimal, yet the civil impact may be massive and
unforeseeable, the full and fair opportunity and incentive test should
avoid any serious problem. Generally, however, it would seem
conducive to the ends of both types of enforcement, to 9 allow
7
criminal findings to assist in subsequent criminal proceedings.
The only other reason advanced for not making criminal
judgments binding has been that the court's decision may not be
infallible 8 This is blindingly obvious, but is not a reason for
limiting the finding's effect in a subsequent trial. As has been
pointed out earlier, a second opportunity to litigate a matter may
result in a different decision, or in the same decision, but is no

96

0f course, the difference in standard of proof would mean that a civil finding should

not give rise to any estoppel in subsequent criminal cases. Similarly, a criminal acquittal
would give rise to no estoppel in a subsequent civil case, because a finding of not guilty
merely denotes a failure to discharge the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
97

The estoppel may be regarded as having analogous effect to orders for compensation

and restitution which may be made in many jurisdictions as part of the sentencing process.
98

U.K. Law Reform Committee, 15th Report, (1967, Cmnd 3391), para. 13.
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guarantee of a better decision.99 In any event, the point, if valid,
would be a reason for limiting the impact of all prior findings, and
not just criminal ones.
2. Is privity inviolable?
At the outset, it was accepted that any non-mutual estoppel
would only apply where the person against whom the estoppel was
asserted in the second proceeding was a party to the earlier finding.
Given the current state of the law, it is not argued, as some have,
that the courts should also eliminate traditional privity, so that a
person in a subsequent proceeding would be estopped on an issue
if that issue was determined in a prior proceeding, and another
person with a similar interest had a full and fair opportunity and
incentive to litigate it.100 In some cases, however, eliminating
mutuality while maintaining privity can result in anomalous
situations.
Consider the Motorcycle Accident 01
In the second
proceeding, it is clear that one of the primary questions to be
litigated in the action by the sidecar passenger is the extent to which
the motorcycle driver was responsible for the accident, an issue
which has been determined against him in the first proceeding.
Privity would prevent the prior finding being asserted against the
passenger, although it could be used in a third-party action against
the motorcyclist. The prospect is therefore raised of inconsistent
decisions within the one proceeding. One way in which this might
be avoided would be to say that a party not privy to the prior
decision is estopped when another person with the same interest,
who is also a party to the second proceedings, was party to the prior

99

See supra, note 7 and accompanying text.

10 0

Lawrence C. George, "Sweet Uses of Adversity: Parklane Hosiery and the Collateral

Class Action" (1980) 32 Stanford L. Rev. 655.
101

Supra, note 1.
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proceeding. This would deal with the anomaly, without preventing
a future reconsideration of the maintenance of the privity
requirement generally.10 2
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions of this paper can be summarized readily:
1. The concept of cause of action estoppel, as it now stands,
has no current utility, being hopelessly emasculated by narrow or
unreasoned approaches to the delineation of what constitutes a
cause of action.
2. The effort to supplement the cause of action estoppel
doctrine with an abuse of process approach is also inadequate,
relying as it does on underlying notions of abuse, and uncertain
criteria for application. However, the basic thrust of the
approach is an improvement over the cause of action estoppel.
3. As regards the two, the best approach would be to merge the
two into a single doctrine of res judicata, which would require a
party to a law suit, whether plaintiff or defendant, to raise all
claims and defences that arise out of or relate to the initial claim
commenced, that are capable of being litigated in the one
proceeding.
4. While the basic doctrine of issue estoppel as conventionally
defined does not have the same fundamental problems as cause
of action estoppel, care must be taken in its application to
ensure that the basic aims of the rule, prevention of re-litigation
and the risk of inconsistent decisions, are well served.
5. The requirement of mutuality in issue estoppel does not
serve the aims of the law, and should be jettisoned. At this
stage the requirement of privity should only be eliminated where
the joinder of parties raises the risk of internal inconsistency in
the later proceeding.
6. Existing attempts to deal with non-mutual estoppel via

102This issue has been recognized (albeit in the context of the prima facie evidence
approach) in one case where the prior criminal finding was allowed against both the criminal
and his employer in the subsequent criminal proceeding: Minto Management, supra, note 79
at 760, Steele J.
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approaches centring on evidentiary weight, abuse of process, or
a discretionary threshold, are all flawed and should be rejected
in favour of an application of issue estoppel, subject only to the
requirement that the party in the former proceeding must have
had an adequate opportunity and incentive to litigate the matter

fully.
7. The fact that the former decision was made in a criminal
proceeding should not matter.
The above approach suggests a more appropriate resolution
to the cases discussed. The Flood Case10 3 could not be considered
to be a case of res judicata, because the claim for damages in
subsequent years could not have been advanced in the original
proceeding. 10 4 It then falls to be decided according to issue
estoppel, which is then a question as to whether the finding that the
defendant's dam did not cause the damage to the plaintiff's property
expressly or implicitly rules out an alternative theory of the aquifer.
In this case, it would be a close question, and may depend upon an
examination of the trial record, but one is inclined to suggest that
the issue of causation of the flooding for the subsequent years
should be estopped by the initial finding that the flooding was an
inevitable consequence of the elevation of the plaintiff's land and its
proximity to the river, and had nothing to do with the dam. 0 5
The Motorcycle Accident 0 6 may also be resolved by an
application of these tests.
The finding of the motorcyclist's
responsibility for the accident in the first action would be conclusive
against both the motorcyclist and the sidecar passenger, as the
motorcyclist was a party to the first action, and has substantially the
same legal interest as the passenger. This would render the thirdparty proceedings in the action unnecessary.

103Supra, note 2.
104

The result parallels that which would have been reached through an application of the

continuing cause of action cases: see supra, note 36.
105

Doering, supra, note 2 at 466.

1 06

Supra, note 1.
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No single legal rule is ever capable of dealing with every
imaginable factual situation, but the approaches suggested will go
farther toward ensuring a degree of consistency in the achievement
of the law's objectives.

